We consider collective quantification in natural language. For many years the common strategy in formalizing collective quantification has been to define the meanings of collective determiners, quantifying over collections, using certain type-shifting operations. These type-shifting operations, i.e., lifts, define the collective interpretations of collective determiners systematically from the standard meanings of quantifiers.
In the next section we illustrate the idea of lifting first-order quantifiers by a few examples. Then we introduce, both, first-order and second-order generalized quantifiers, and show that the type theoretic approach can be redefined in terms of second-order generalized quantifiers. The idea of typeshifting turns out to be very closely related to the notion of definability which is central in generalized quantifier theory. We show that the type-shifting operations considered in the literature (i.e. lifts) are definable in secondorder logic. This observation allows us to point out the restrictions of the type-shifting strategy used in the literature. In particular, we show that the collective meaning of the determiner Most can not be uniformly defined by any lift definable in second-order logic, unless the counting hierarchy collapses in computational complexity theory.
Lifting first-order determiners
Let us consider the following example sentences involving collective quantification.
(8) Five people lifted the table.
(9) Some students played poker together.
(10) All combinations of cards are losing in some situations.
The type-shifting strategy defines the collective readings of determiners by raising the types of the corresponding distributive determiners. In other words, the idea is to lift first-order generalized quantifiers -expressing properties of subsets of the discourse -into the second-order setting, in which it is possible to speak about the properties of collections of all subsets over a given domain. Let us analyze the examples.
The distributive reading of the sentence (8) claims that the total number of students who lifted the table on their own is exactly five. This statement can be formalized in elementary logic by the formula (11):
The collective interpretation of (8) claims that there was a collection of exactly five students who jointly lifted the table. This can be formalized by lifting the formula (11) to the second-order formula (12):
In the similar way, by lifting the corresponding first-order determiners, we can express the collective readings of sentences (9)-(10) as follows:
All the examples above can be described in terms of the uniform procedure of turning a determiner of type ((et)((et)t)) into a determiner of type ((et)(((et)t)t)) by the means of the type-shifting operator called existential modifier, (·) EM . Fix a universe of discourse U and take any X ⊆ U, and Y ⊆ P(U ). Define the existential lift Q EM of a quantifier Q in the following way:
In the literature, lifts have been defined also for distributive and so-called neutral readings of sentences. For example, Ben Avi and Winter (2003) define the following lift -called dfit -for determiner fitting, to overcome some problems related to the monotonicity properties of the previous lifts considered in the literature. Note that the dfit operator turns a determiner of type ((et)((et)t)) to a determiner of type (((et)t)(((et)t)t)), i.e., for all X, Y ⊆ P(U ) we have that
For us the most important observation is that all the lifts proposed in the literature (see Winter, 2001 , for an overview) are definable by the means of second-order logic.
In the next section we recall the mathematical definitions of first-order and second-order generalized quantifiers. We also discuss the notion of definability which is a central concept in generalized quantifier theory. Then we show that collective determiners relate to second-order generalized quantifiers just like distributive determiners relate to first-order generalized quantifiers.
3 Generalized quantifiers
Lindström quantifiers
Let us first recall the definition of a first-order generalized quantifier formulated by Lindström (1966) .
Let s = ( 1 , . . . , r ) be a tuple of positive integers. A first-order generalized (Lindström) quantifier of type s is a class Q of structures of vocabulary τ s = {P 1 , . . . , P r }, such that P i is i -ary for 1 ≤ i ≤ r, and Q is closed under isomorphisms.
To illustrate the notion let us look at some well-known examples of firstorder generalized quantifiers.
The first two examples are the standard first-order universal and existential quantifiers, both of type (1). The other examples are also familiar from natural language semantics. Their aim is to capture the truth-conditions of sentences of the form: "Even number of A's are B", "Most A's are B"
and "Some A is B". Divisibility quantifier Q even is of type (1), whereas the quantifiers Most 1 and Some are of type (1, 1).
First-order generalized quantifiers enable us to enrich the expressive power of first-order logic in a very controlled and minimal way. We define the extension, FO(Q), of first-order logic by a quantifier Q in the following way:
• The formula formation rules of FO are extended by the rule:
) is a formula.
• The satisfaction relation of FO is extended by the rule:
where
First-order generalized quantifiers have been used extensively in formalsemantics of natural language to model distributive determiners (see Westerståhl and Peters, 2006) . However, they are not adequate in formalizing collective quantification. In the next section we present an intuitive and natural extension of Lindström quantifiers, second-order generalized quantifiers. They turn out to be a natural concept for interpreting the meanings of collective determiners in natural language. Moreover, this concept is consistent with the principles of atomicity, completeness, and atoms discussed in the introduction. We begin with the formal definitions.
Second-order generalized quantifiers
Second-order generalized quantifiers were first defined and applied in the context of descriptive complexity theory by Burtschick and Vollmer (1998) .
The general notion of a second-order generalized quantifier was later formulated by Andersson (2002) . The following definition is a straightforward generalization from the first-order case. However, note that the types of second-order generalized quantifiers are more complicated than the types of first-order generalized quantifiers, since predicate variables can have different arities. Let t = (s 1 , . . . , s w ), where s i = ( i 1 , . . . , i r i ), be a tuple of tuples of positive integers, for 1 ≤ i ≤ w. A second order structure of type t is a structure of the form (M, P 1 , . . . , P w ), where
Below, we write f [A] for the image of A under the function f .
A second-order generalized quantifier Q of type t is a class of structures of type t such that Q is closed under isomorphisms: if (M, P 1 , . . . , P w ) ∈ Q and f : M → N is a bijection such that
The following examples show that second-order generalized quantifiers are a natural extension from the first-order case.
The first example is the familiar unary second-order existential quantifier.
The type of ∃ 2 is ( (1)). The quantifier Even says that a formula holds for an even number of subsets of the universe. On the other hand, the quantifier Even says that all the subsets satisfying a formula have an even number of elements. The quantifier Most 2 applies to two formulas ψ and ϕ and says that more than half of the subsets satisfying ψ also satisfy ϕ.
As in the first-order case, we define the extension, FO(Q), of FO by a second-order generalized quantifier Q in the following way:
• Second order variables are introduced to FO.
if for 1 ≤ i ≤ w, ϕ i (X i ) is a formula and X i = (X 1,i , . . . , X r i ,i ) is a tuple of pairwise distinct predicate variables, such that arity(X j,i ) = i j , for 1 ≤ j ≤ r i , then
Definability
The concept of definability is central in generalized quantifier theory. Informally, definability of a quantifier Q in a logic L means that there is a uniform way to express every formula of the form Q x ϕ in L.
Formally, let Q be a first-order generalized quantifier of type s and L a logic. We say that the quantifier Q is definable in L if there is a sentence ϕ ∈ L of vocabulary τ s such that for any τ s -structure M:
Let L and L be logics. The logic L is at least as strong as the logic L ( L ≤ L ) if for every sentence ϕ ∈ L over any vocabulary there exists a sentence ψ ∈ L over the same vocabulary such that
Below, we assume that the logic L has the so-called Substitution Property,
i.e., that the logic L is closed under substituting predicates by formulas. The following fact is well-known for Lindström quantifiers.
Proposition 3.1. Let Q be a first-order generalized quantifier and L a logic.
Proof. Since Q = Mod(ϕ), where ϕ = Q x 1 , . . . , x r (P 1 (x 1 ), . . . , P r (x r )) the implication from right to left follows. For the other direction, we use recursively the fact that if ϕ is the formula which defines Q and ψ 1 (x 1 ), . . . , ψ r (x r ) are formulas of L, then
where the formula on the right is obtained by substituting every occurrence
In the second-order case, analogous notion of definability can be formulated. We do not give the formal definition here. However, things are not completely analogous to the first-order case. With second-order generalized quantifiers L(Q) ≡ L does not imply that the quantifier Q is definable in the logic L. The converse implication is still valid.
Proposition 3.2 (Kontinen (2004) ). Let Q be a second-order generalized quantifier and L a logic. If the quantifier Q is definable in L then
Proof. The idea and the proof is analogous to the first-order case. Here we substitute second-order predicates by formulas having free second-order variables.
In Kontinen (2002) it was shown that the extension L * of FO by all first-order generalized quantifiers cannot define the monadic second-order existential quantifier. In other words, the logic L * , in which all properties of first-order structures can be defined, cannot express in a uniform way that a collection of subsets of the universe is non-empty. This observation can be used to argue for the fact that first-order generalized quantifiers alone are not adequate for formalizing all natural language quantification. For example, as quantifier ∃ 2 is not definable in L * , the logic L * cannot express the collective reading of sentences like (15).
(15) Some students gathered to play poker.
Defining collective determiners
In this section we show that collective determiners can be easily identified with certain second-order generalized quantifiers.
At first sight, there seem to be a problem with identifying the collective determiners with second-order generalized quantifiers; some of the collective determiners discussed have a mixed type ((et)(((et)t)t)) 1 . However, this is not a problem since it is straightforward to extend the definition to allow also quantifiers with mixed types. Denote by SomeProposition 4.1 shows that the type shifting strategy cannot take us outside of second-order logic. In the next section we show that it is very unlikely that all collective determiners in natural language can be defined in second-order logic. Our argument is based on the close connection between second-order generalized quantifiers and certain complexity classes in computational complexity theory.
Lifting the determiner Most
Let us return to the example sentences (4)- (7) from the introduction. For readability, we repeat (7) here as (19).
(19) Most groups of students have never played Hold'em together.
It is easy to see that (19) can be formalized using the quantifier Most 2 by:
We assume above that the predicates Students(X) and Play(Y ) are interpreted as collections of sets of atomic entities of the universe of discourse.
Obviously, this is just one possible way of interpreting (19). However, it seems that something like Most 2 is needed in the formalization assuming that Students(X) and Play(Y ) are interpreted as collective predicates.
For the sake of argument, let us assume that our formalization of sentence (19) is correct. It is easy to see that the lifts discussed before do not give the intended meaning when applied to the first-order quantifier Most 1 . We shall next show that it is unlikely that any lift, which can be defined in second-order logic, can do the job. More precicely, we shall show (Theorem 5.1 below) that if the quantifier Most 2 can be lifted from the first-order Most 1 using a lift, which is definable in second-order logic, then something unexpected happens in computational complexity. This result indicates that the type-shifting strategy used to define the collective determiners in the literature is probably not general enough to cover all collective quantification in natural language.
We shall next discuss the complexity theoretic side of our argument.
Recall that second-order logic corresponds in the complexity theoretic side to the polynomial hierarchy, PH, (see Stockmeyer, 1977 Turing machine N such that, for all inputs x, x ∈ L iff more than half of the computations of N on input x end up accepting. The counting hierarchy can be defined now as follows in terms of oracle Turing machines
(1) C 0 P = PTIME,
It is known that PH is contained in the second level C 2 P of CH (see Toda, 1991) . The question whether CH ⊆ PH is still open.
Now, we can turn to the theorem which is fundamental for our argumentation.
Theorem 5.1. If the quantifier Most 2 is definable in second-order logic, then CH = PH and CH collapses to its second level.
Proof. The proof is based on the observation Kontinen and Niemistö (2006) that already the logic FO(Most 2 ) can define complete problems for each level of the counting hierarchy. On the other hand, if the quantifier Most 2 is definable in second-order logic, then by Proposition 3.2 we would have that FO(Most 2 ) ≤ SO and therefore SO would contain complete problems for each level of the counting hierarchy. This would imply that CH = PH and furthermore that CH ⊆ PH ⊆ C 2 P .
Note that even if CH = PH would be true, this does not automatically imply that the quantifier Most 2 can be defined in second-order logic. In fact, it would be very surprising if this would be the case.
Conclusion
We have showed that the higher-order approach to collective quantification in natural language can be formalized in terms of second-order generalized quantifiers. The previous attempts have relied implicitly on quantifiers which can be defined in second-order logic. We have presented an argument indicating that second-order definable quantifiers are probably not general enough to cover all collective quantification in natural language.
